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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - - -
JOHN EL WOOD DENNETT 
Plaintiff & Appellant 
vs. No. 11256 
ALVIN I. SMITH 
Defendant & Respondant 
-------------------------
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
Appeal from the Order of Dismissal of 
the Honorable Judge Leonard Elton, 
Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah 
Mr. John G. Marshall, esq. 
John E. Dmnett 
Plaintiff &: Appeallant 
Appaaring pro se 
1243 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondant 
53 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN EL WOOD DENNETT 
Plaintiff & Appellant 
vs. Case No. 
11256 
ALVIN I. SMITH 
Defendant & Respondant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a case to recover damages against 
Defendant for derogatory statements he made against 
Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered an order on 
April 3, 1968 dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the 
grounds that the same did not state a cause of action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the order of dis-
missal, an order of this court reinstating the action, 
and a remand of this court to the district court for 
the taking of evidence and the entry of judgment there-
upon. 
STATEMENT'OF THE FACTS 
Alvin I. Smith is a prominent attorney and 
businessman with his offices in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
On September 14, 1967, the District Court nominated 
him as a receiver on some property in Sugarhouse, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, where plaintiff has his office. 
Although that nomination was made without 
hearing any evidence, and although Mr. Smith has yet 
to file his bond and qualify to act in the office and:.cal-
ling to which the court has named him, he persists in 
believing that he has some status with respect to the 
property in question. 
That matter, however, is not directly invol-
ved in this appeal, but is offered only as background. 
The relationship, during the period since his nomin-
ation, as between plaintiff and defendant has become 
gradually worse. During the months of September, 
October, November and December of last year, how-
ever, it was not totally bad. Both parties were making 
an attempt at getting along, especially in the month 
of September. 
One tenant in the building was Phil Phillips, 
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a friend of plaintiff. 
For reasons which plaintiff has not yet fathomed, 
Mr. Smith, as part of his office and calling, has under-
taken to methodically discredit, disparage, undermine, 
slander, and degrade plaintiff. He acts as if he needs 
to lower the esteem of someone else so that he might 
appear grander and more majestic by comparison. 
Mr. Smith told Mr. Phillips that plaintiff was a 
thief; that he had stolen his grandmother's money; that 
as a result thereof plaintiff had been disbarred. It is 
believed that he made similar statements to Louise Kirk 
and Robert Overby, two other tenants in the building, 
to Don E. Sparks, a third tenant in the building, and to 
Larry Nicholsen, a fourth tenant in the building. 
While each tenant has intimated to plaintiff that Mr. 
Smith had made such statements, they have been unwil-
ling to make any unequivocal statements to plaintiff upon 
which plaintiff can base a slander suit. 
Mr. Philllips and Mr. Nicholsen, disgusted with 
Mr. Smith and his immature antics, decided that they 
could not continue to run a business with Mr. Smith ar-
ound. They moved out. Upon moving out, Mr. Phillips 
sought plaintiff out and told him that he was now free to 
tell plaintiff what Mr. Smith had previously said to him 
about plaintiff. 
It is anticipated that Mr. Overby and Mrs. Kirk, 
who have also moved out of the building in the meantime 
for the same reasons , will be willing to disclose to the 
plaintiff the details of Mr. Smith's stories to them, but 
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that matter has not yet been pursued.:-'•:. 
The statements upon which this suit is based are 
those statements which Mr. Smith made to Mr. Phil-
lips. The theory that underlies plaintiff's complaint 
is that a person who makes such statements as Mr. 
Smith is accused of making should be called to account 
and should respond in damages. 
After learning about the s tatem en ts, plaintiff waited 
a few days in order to gain some perspective about the 
matter, and then filed'.-1the action, :following Prosser 
on Torts in framing the allegations of the complaint. 
After waiting the full 20 days, and even 2 days longer 
than the 20 days in which to answer, Mr. Smith filed a 
motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, claiming that 
the complaint failed to state a claim against defendant 
upon which relief could be granted, and claiming further, 
that since plaintiff had been adjudged a bankrupt, he 
was not the proper party to bring the action. 
At the hearing set for March 12th, 1968 before Judge 
Leonard Elton, Mr. John G. Marshall, appearing for 
Mr. Smith as counsel, argued that upon authority of 
a 1905 North Dakota case, (Kirby vs. Martindale, 
cited hereinafter), and upon authority of 33 AmJur 
Libel & Slander 236, an obsolete 1941 authority, the 
complaint was fatally defective because of its failure 
to set for the words of defamation verbatim. Mr. 
Marshall stated that they conceded the other grounds, 
namely that of the involuntary adjudication of bankruptcy, 
and that that premise was abandoned. 
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Judge Elton held, after taking the matter under ad-
visement, that slanderous matter must be pleaded ver-
batim, and entered a minute order directing that plaint-
iff's complaint be dismissed. 
When Mr. Marshall prepared the order, he used 
this verbiage: 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's 
complaint be, and the same is hereby dismissed 
unless plaintiff amends his complaint to set forth 
a legally sufficient cause of action within 20 days. 
The right to amend is implicit in such an order, but 
being used to some of the tactics of Messrs. Smith & 
Marshall, plaintiff wanted to be sure that there would 
be no argument about plaintiff's right to amend, so 
plaintiff prepared an addendum to the order which gave 
plaintiff specific leave to amend. 
This addendum was not rejected, it was not entered, 
it was not sent back. It was simply ignored. 
Upon hearing for the first time in court that slander 
actions must set forth verbatim the defammatory words, 
plaintiff unaertook some research on the subject. The 
findings are set forth later in the argument and need not 
be stated here. After concluding that the claim of Mr. 
Marshall was wholly untenable, plaintiff was faced with 
' the question of whether to amend or appeal. 
, Even though the trial court was totally in error on 
1 
this point it seemed easier to comply than to dissent. 
I J 
It really didn't make that much difference, and an am-
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anded complaint is much easier to write than an appeal 
is to prosecute. So after reserving an exception to the 
court's ruling, plaintiff wrote an amended complaint, 
sending it to Judge Elton, together with the addendum 
to the order, to be filed. 
The order of Mr. Marshall, plaintiff's addendum to 
the order and plaintiff's amended complaint reached 
Judge Elton at approximately the same time. He let 
all three sit on his desk for most of a month. On 
April 3rd, he signed the order of dismissal, but did 
not sign the addendum or accept the amended complaint 
for filing. Various contacts were made with his clerk, 
Richard Porter to see what the trouble was, if any. 
Plaintiff received assurances from the clerk, that the 
amended complaint would be filed within the 20 days 
allowed. On April 23rd, the complaint was still not 
filed, and now could not be found. The time to.amend 
had now passed, and the order of dismissal had be-
come a final judgment. 
The only recourse now was to stand on the original 
complaint, and file an appeal. To this end, and to min-
imize the number of items affecting plaintiff in the Sup-
reme Court, plaintiff approached Mr. Marshall, by 
letter, asking that Mr. Marshall consent to the filing 
of the amended complaint, even after the 20 days al-
lowed, to avoid an appeal, indicating that a response 
to this question must be received before May 3rd if an 
appeal were to be averted. Mr. Marshall ignored the 
letter. A telephone follow-up on May 3rd was brushed 
off. There was no recourse open to plaintiff except to 
file an appeal. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
Plaintiff is prone to read into the actions of the Dis-
trict Court certain interpretations which may not be 
completely justified. Taken in the context of other treat-
ment received in recent months, plaintiff is at a loss 
to know why the District Court would allow exactly 20 
days in which to file an amended complaint, and then 
hold the amended complaint on the Court's desk until 
after the 2 0 days had expired. Had plaintiff not made 
a casual inquiry at the Clerk's office between the 20th 
and 30th day, the cause would have been gone forever, 
having been past the time for appeal and beyond the time 
allowed for amendment. 
Be that as it may; the incident may have been ac-
cidental and inad vertant. This matter is now before 
this court on the original complaint arx:l the order of 
dismissal which has now become a final judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: A MOTION TO DISMISS ATTACKS THE 
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY, NOT THE FACTUAL SUFFIC-
IENCY OF A COMPLAINT. 
To use a colloquialism, a motion to dismiss is def-
endant's way of saying, 11So what." He is in effect 
saying, "Even if everything you allege turns out to be 
true, you haven't said anything or proven anything which 
would entitle you to anything. 11 In assessing the ef-
ficacy of a motion to dismiss, the court assumes, as 
a matter of course, that the evidence will rise to the 
allegations of the complaint. If the court finds that the 
allegations, if proven, would state a cause of action, 
it must deny the motion to dismiss. Conversely, if 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
the allegations, even assuming they were proven facts 
fail to say anything, the court is compelled to dismiss: 
Lawyers nowadays are prone to confuse a motion to 
dismiss with a demurrer. It is true that a demurrer 
would lie if a complaint failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. But a demurrer went 
further than that. Even if a complaint did state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted, a court was em-
powered to uphold a defendant's demurrer if some rule 
of pleading was overlooked or not complied with. 
The narrower grounds for a demurrer still exist in 
our motions to dismiss. If a complaint fails to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, a motion will 
lie under the p:rbYisiOns of Rule 12(b)(6). 
The broader grounds of the now obsolete demurrer 
are preserved under Rule 12(e) and Rule 12(f). If some 
technical requirement of pleading is not complied with, 
a person may take appropriate action, but it does not 
have as its consequence an order of dismissal, as does 
Rule 12(b). 
This is important, because Mr. Marshall, in his ar-
gument to chc .0istrict Court relied upon an old case, 
which while legally sufficient in terms of stating a claim, 
could not withstand the defendant's demurrer because 
the plaintiff had failed to set forth verbatim, the slanderous 
words and actions which were the basis of his claim. 
POINT TWO: PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT STATES A 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Prosser defines defammation as being: 
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. an invasion of the interest in reputation 
and good name, by communication to others 
which tends to diminish the esteem in which 
the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse feel-
ings or opinions against him, The defammatory 
meaning of the communication may be apparent 
upon its face, or it may arise from extrinsic 
circumstances, which the plaintiff is then re-
quired to plead and prove. (Page 572) 
Incidently, Prosser adds this following interesting 
comment: 
Some kinds of slander are actionable without 
proof of damage, Namely, (a) The imputation 
of a serious crime, (b) The imputation of cer-
tain loathsome diseases, (c) Imputations af-
fecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, pro-
fession, or office, and (d) The imputation of 
unchastity of a woman. (Page 584) 
Mr. Smith's ill advised remarks fall squarely with-
in categories (a) and (c) above. 
Now plaintiff's complaint alleges clearly each one 
of the elements. It alleges a defammation. It alleges 
a communication or publication to a third party, namely, 
Phil Phillips,, It alleges when it took place. It alleges 
that the pefendant.si.sl-th~ pa:i;ty,,who.: committedrthELtart. 
It alleges that the plaintiff was damaged thereby. 
What is defendant's contention, then? In the district 
court, Mr. Marshall argued that since the complaint 
did not set forth verbatim the slanderous language, it 
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should be dismissed. This, if proper would be grounds 
for a motion to strike, or for a more definite statement, 
but not to dismiss. The only question before the court 
on a lZ(b) (6) motion is: Does this complaint, assuming 
the allegations to be capable of proof, state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted? If it does, the motion 
should be denied. 
It is submitted that plaintiff's complaint does. 
POINT THREE: IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY, UNDER 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TO PLEAD 
VERBATIM THE SLANDEROUS LANGU1\:GE WHICH CON-
STITUTES THE TORT. 
There is no record in this case, inasmuch as the 
whole proceeding thus far consists of pleadings and 
argument. There is nothing in either to disclose 
Mr. Marshall 1s thinking, but having heard the oral 
argument in District Court, plaintiff is constrained 
to anticipate his argument on appeal and reply to 
it in advance. 
He begins by citing 33 AmJur Libel & Slander 236. 
At first blush, he is correct. On the top of page 215 
where this section is to be found, Am Jur says: 
11The great weight of authority supports the 
view that in the absence of any statutory pro-
vision to the contrary, it (the slanderous lan-
b • II guage) must be produced ver at1m. 
The leading case is set forth in footnote 15 
on that same page (215), Kirby vs. Martindale, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
103 NW 648. It was amazing how consistently this 
case was followed for more than two decades. The 
North Dakota Supreme Court followed its own decision 
in the case of Ellsworth vs. Martindale (268 NW 400 
at 404). Several other courts followed the same hold-
ing, almost without variance. 
Suddenly it was ignored and dropped. Shepard's 
citations indicate that the last and latest reference to 
the holding was in 1936, which was the Ellsworth case 
cited hereinabove. The court distinguished the Ells-
worth case from the Kirby case, but dictumwise ap-
proved its former rule. 
Volume 33 of AmJur was printed in 1941, which is 
the copyright date. Corpus Juris Secundum, which was 
printed in 1948 (this volume on Libel & Slander) does 
not even dignify the Kirby Case and its sequel with a 
footnote or comment. Why? 
Something new was happening in 1948. Between 
1941 and 1948 the nation was establishing a new trend-
Rules of Civil Procedure were being born. Courts 
were getting away from code pleading and common-
law pleading. Rules that had hitherto required plain-
tiffs to plead their evidence in their complaints were 
now obsolete. Defendant's remedy to get at plaintiff's 
case was through discovery--to eliminate rabbits out 
of hats and other sundry surprises at trial. 
Before the rule upon which Mr. Marshall relies had 
suffered its final demise, in the Ellsworth case, the 
North Dakota court favored us with an explanation of 
the reason for the rule that slandered plaintiffs must 
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set forth the slanderous material verbatim. It said: 
"(The reason is) to set before the court the 
material (so that its legal sufficiency could 
be examined) and to advise the defendant of 
the exact charge he would have to meet." 
(268 NW/ 400) 
How nicely our new rules handle all of this. By 
rules 26-45, defendant can be advised before trial of 
the exact evidence he will have to meet. 
The court, under Rule 12(d) (Motion for judgment 
on the pleadings), or under Rule 56(c) {Motion for sum-
mary judgment)~ or Rule 50 (Directed Verdict) can con-
sider the legal sufficiency of the slanderous material. 
All of the reasons for the Kirby rule are now met 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
After 1936, not one single court can be found that 
even mentions or considers this hitherto important 
case. Is there a reason? 
Now how shco'uld matters be pleaded since the ad-
option of our rules in 1950? We might examine Rule 
8(a). 
11A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief 
. . . shall contain (1) a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the 
relief to which he deems himself entitled. 11 
Let us consider Rule S(e}: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
"Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, 
concise, and direct. 11 
Let us also consider Rule '.8{f): 
"All pleadings shall be so construed to do 
substantial justice. " 
Let us also consider Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Libel and Slander, Section 161 on page 245: 
"Although at Common Law, great strictness 
and formality were required of the pleadings, 
and aeclarations were to have the same degree 
of certainty as an indictment, under modern 
practice, greater freedom is allowed in plead-
irig s, especially in jurisdittions where statutes 
{or rules) have undertaken to simplify the plead-
ings in defamation actions, and to relieve them 
of undue formality and technicality.'' 
The only vestige we have of common-law or code 
pleading is in the area of Fraud and Deceit, which 
must be pleaded with particularity, i. e. , the evidence 
must be pleaded, in accordance with Rule 9(b). All 
other pleadings are governed by Rule 8. 
It is interesting to note that Am Jur is being revised 
and serially replaced by AmJur 2nd. The series as 
revised has not yet reached the Libel and Slander 
treatise, but it seems incredible to believe that the 
revised volume will state any rule different than 
Corpus Juris Secundum. The Kii:r.by Rule and Ells-
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worth rules simply fell by the wayside when the Rules 
of Civil Procedure were adopted. 
POINT FOUR: THIS ACTION AGAINST MR. SMITH 
rs UNAFFECTED BY PLAINTIFF'S CHAPTER XII 
PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL COURT. 
Mr. Marshall said, at the hearing on his motion 
to dismiss that he conceded this point to plaintiff, and 
abandoned the argument as being a valid premise. If 
so, conversation at this point is wasted, but since there 
an unusual amount of unpredictability and shifting of 
counsel going on, it would be prudent to at least pres-
erve the argument, augmenting it if respondant's brief 
.shows any inclination to pursue it. 
The petition pending before the Federal Court is 
a Chapter XII proceeding. This is not a bankruptcy, 
although it is provided for as part of the bankruptcy 
act. It is a rehabilitation proceeding, and was filed 
to bring to rest Messrs. Tuft, Marshall's and Smith's 
harrassment so that petitioner could finish school, 
some accounting work, and get some real estate inv-
estments productive again. It has failed its purpose 
in that regard .. The District Court, as well as Messrs 
Tuft, Marshall, and Smith simply ignore the stay or-
ders and proceed against plaintiff anyway. 
That is really peripheral, and appropriate relief 
lies in other remedies. Important here is to note 
that Judge Christensen's order of ordinary adjudication 
is on appeal, and until he is upheld by the Circuit 
Court, it will remain a Chapter XII proceeding. While 
e!_aintiff feels that a summary reversal is a foregone 
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conclusion, that is not really important either. Im-
portant is only the fact that the petition was filed on 
September 15th, 1967. If the adjudication were to 
be upheld by the Circuit, it would not affect causes 
0 £ action accruing after September 15th, 1967. 
Moreover, slander actions and title thereto remain 
in an (alleged} bankrupt, and do not pass· to the trustee 
even in valid bankruptcies, which plaintiff's proceeding 
is not. 
Section Seventy of Chapters I-VII of Title 11 of 
use, provides, inter alia: 
(That} Rights of action ex delicto for libel, 
slander, injuries to the person of the bank-
rupt, or a relative, whether olr not resulting 
in death, seduction, or criminal conversation, 
shall not vest in the trustee." 
It is clear, that regardless of the outcome of the 
chapter XII proceeding, title will remain vested in 
this plaintiff to his cause of action and never pass to 
any trustee. 
Moreover, even if some sort of title were to pass 
to a trustee, this does not create a defense for a 
tort-feasor. It merely means that the trustee would 
succeed to the plaintiff's right to collect the damages. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a very simple case, legally speaking. The 
requirements for pleading are governed :by Rule 8 of 
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and not by the Kir-
by and Ellsworth Rules from North Dakota, which are 
approved by Section 236 of AmJur on Libel and Slander, 
but which are now obsolete. Plaintiff's right to pro-
ceed is unaffected by the pendency of his Chapter XII 
proceedings, no matter how they turn out. 
WHEREFORE plaintiff prays judgment reversing 
the order of dismissal heretofore entered herein, 
and that he be awarded his costs herein incurred. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John E. Dennett 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
Appearing pro se 
1243 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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